Spatial Competition and Lowest Price Commitment

Hao Wang

Author information




National School of Development, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

E-mail: qhwang@nsd.pku.edu.cn

Abstract




This paper suggests that credibly committing to the strictly lowest price can be profitable and self-fulfilling in a spatial price competition. Consumers live in multiple residential zones. Each zone has a store. Consumers incur heterogeneous transportation costs moving between two zones. When there is one store credibly committing to the strictly lowest price, there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which a discount store directly competes with all other stores. The discount store offers the lowest price, takes the largest market share, and makes more profits than the other stores. Moreover, the low price commitment is not binding in equilibrium, which implies that the commitment is self-fulfilling.

 Keywords




convenience store, discount store, low price commitment, spatial competition

Cite this article




Hao Wang. Spatial Competition and Lowest Price Commitment. Front. Econ. China, 2016, 11(3): 519‒536 https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-005-016-0027-1


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